

Varying Risk Confidence

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“... the utility of money or other rewards is not independent of the circumstances under which it is obtained ...” (Smith, 1969 on Ellsberg, 1961)

“... risk-taking is indeed content-specific ...” (Weber, Blais and Betz, 2002)

“... we propose to clarify, with respect to clients' risk-bearing capacity, that any particular consumer has not only one and overall risk attitude but different risk attitudes towards different investment targets ... ” (European Securities and Markets Authority, May 2014)

Sources of risk can differ for several reasons

- knowledge of the stochastic nature of the risk being faced
- moral implications
- social implications
- time frames

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PROVIDE A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR
DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY WITH MULTIPLE
SOURCES

Earlybird example

A paradigmatic example is given by the choice between two cars
Assume available cars **X** and **Y** are described by only two characteristics:
gas mileage and safety but different specialistic journals report different
values for these characteristics, e.g.

	Gas Mileage	Safety
X	A 20	A 5
	B 21	B 4.5
	C 17	C 4
	D 19	D 5
Y	A 24	A 4
	B 25	B 4
	C 23	C 3.5
	D 22	D 4.5

The end at the beginning

$$U(X_1, \dots, X_n) = u_1^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_1} [u_1(X_1)] + \dots + u_n^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_n} [u_n(X_n)]$$

where (X_1, \dots, X_n) is a vector of omogeneous random attributes and (u_1, \dots, u_n) are the corresponding utilities.

Therefore, $u_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(X_i)]$ is the certainty equivalent of X_i w.r.t. u_i and p_i , i.e., the sure quantity which is equivalent to X_i

This can be extended to the case in which attributes are not homogeneous

$$U(X_1, \dots, X_n) = W_1 (u_1^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_1} [u_1(X_1)]) + \dots + W_n (u_n^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_n} [u_n(X_n)])$$

(but not today, except...)

Ellsberg example


“... You have the following information. Urn 1 contains 100 red and black balls, but in a ratio entirely unknown to you; there may be from 0 to 100 red balls. In Urn 2, you confirm that there are exactly 50 red and 50 black balls ...

1. Which do you prefer to bet on, r_1 or b_1 ; or are you indifferent? That is, drawing a ball from Urn 1, on which "event" do you prefer the \$100 stake, red or black: or do you care? ...”

and the typical preference pattern is

red on Urn 1 \sim black on Urn 1 \prec red on Urn 2 \sim black on Urn 2

Moral dilemmas (inspired by Thomson, 1976)



In both cases, 1 casualty with probability p and 5 with probability $1 - p$.

- The multiplicity of sources is represented by a family $\{S_i\}_{i \in I}$ of finite state spaces
- Choice consequences are real numbers (e.g., monetary rewards or casualties)
- A prospect depending on source i is a random variable $X_i : S_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ where $x = X_i(s_i)$ is the consequence of choosing X_i in state s_i
- The set of all prospects depending on source i is denoted by \mathcal{X}_i
- Preferences are represented by a binary relation \succsim on $\mathcal{X} = \bigcup_{i \in I} \mathcal{X}_i$
- \succsim_i denotes the restriction of \succsim to \mathcal{X}_i

Ellsberg example again

Setting $S_1 = \{r_1, b_1\}$ and $S_2 = \{r_2, b_2\}$ bets have the form

	r_1	b_1		r_2	b_2	
R_1	100	0	and	R_2	100	0
B_1	0	100		B_2	0	100

and the typical preference pattern is

$$R_1 \sim B_1 \prec R_2 \sim B_2$$

Axiom (SDEU)

For every $i \in I$, \succsim_i on \mathcal{X}_i is a continuous and strictly increasing weak order satisfying cardinal coordinate independence.

Lemma (Wakker, 1988)

A binary relation on \mathcal{X} satisfies SDEU iff for every $i \in I$, there exist a strictly increasing and continuous function $u_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and a strictly positive probability measure $p_i \in \Delta(S_i)$ such that, given $X_i, Y_i \in \mathcal{X}_i$,

$$X_i \succsim_i Y_i \iff \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(X_i)] \geq \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(Y_i)].$$

Moreover, the elements of $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique up to positive affine transformations and the elements of $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique.

Transitivity

Axiom (TRAN)

The relation \succsim is transitive.

Axiom (COMP)

For every $i, j \in I$ and $x \in C$, there is $y \in C$ such that $x \mathbb{I}_{S_i} \sim y \mathbb{I}_{S_j}$.

For example, if the DM is a risk manager

- for *financial risks*, a state s_i describes the situation of financial markets
- for *operational risks*, a state s_j describes the situation of internal processes (people and systems behavior) and external accidents

For the DM a sure \$ 10 million financial loss might not be equivalent to a sure operational loss of the same amount, but, e.g., it could be equivalent to a sure \$ 12 million operational loss

Proposition

Let \succsim be a binary relation on \mathcal{X} . The following conditions are equivalent:

- (i) \succsim satisfies SDEU, TRAN, and COMP;
- (ii) there exist three families
 - $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly increasing continuous functions $u_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$,
 - $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly positive probability measures $p_i \in \Delta(S_i)$,
 - $\{\delta_{ji}\}_{j,i \in I}$ of strictly increasing continuous functions $\delta_{ji} : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfying $\delta_{ki} = \delta_{kj} \circ \delta_{ji}$ and $\delta_{ii} = \text{id}_{\mathbb{R}}$ for all $i, j, k \in I$,

such that, given $i, j \in I$, $X_i \in \mathcal{X}_i$ and $Y_j \in \mathcal{X}_j$,

$$X_i \succsim Y_j \iff u_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(X_i)] \geq \delta_{ij} \left(u_j^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_j} [u_j(Y_j)] \right).$$

The elements of $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique up to positive affine transformations, the elements of $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ and $\{\delta_{ji}\}_{j,i \in I}$ are unique.

Inter-source rate of substitution

Notice that for every $i, j \in I$, $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$x \mathbb{I}_{S_i} \sim y \mathbb{I}_{S_j} \iff y = \delta_{ji}(x)$$

If the only difference between source i and source j is the quality of the information about the stochastic nature of state realizations (like in the Ellsberg example), it is compelling to consider

Axiom (SCOM)

For every $i, j \in I$ and $x \in \mathbb{R}$, $x \mathbb{I}_{S_i} \sim x \mathbb{I}_{S_j}$.

Which strengthens COMP and implies $\delta_{ij} = \text{id}_{\mathbb{R}}$ for all $i, j \in I$

Proposition

Let \succsim be a binary relation on \mathcal{X} . The following conditions are equivalent:

- (i) \succsim satisfies SDEU, TRAN, and SCOM;
- (ii) there exist two families
 - $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly increasing continuous functions $u_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$,
 - $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly positive probability measures $p_i \in \Delta(S_i)$,

such that, given $i, j \in I$, $X_i \in \mathcal{X}_i$ and $Y_j \in \mathcal{X}_j$,

$$X_i \succsim Y_j \iff u_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(X_i)] \geq u_j^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_j} [u_j(Y_j)].$$

The elements of $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique up to positive affine transformations, the elements of $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique.

A MAUT approach

Assume $I = \{1, \dots, N\}$ and set $\mathcal{X}^* = \mathcal{X}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{X}_N$ and preference \succsim^* are defined on \mathcal{X}^*

$$\mathbf{X} = (X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)$$

is a “portfolio of risks” depending on different sources

Identify

$$\mathcal{X}_i \equiv \{(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) \in \mathcal{X}^* : X_j = 0\mathbb{I}_{S_j} \text{ if } j \neq i\}$$

$$\mathcal{X} \equiv \bigcup_{i \in I} \{(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) \in \mathcal{X}^* : X_j = 0\mathbb{I}_{S_j} \text{ if } j \neq i\}$$

and denote by

- \succsim the restriction of \succsim^* to \mathcal{X}
- \succsim_i the restriction of \succsim (i.e. of \succsim^*) to \mathcal{X}_i

Axiom (MONO)

If $X_i \succsim_i Y_i$ for all $i \in I$, then $(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n) \succsim^* (Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_n)$.

Axiom (CONT)

\succsim^* is continuous.

Axiom (INDI)

If $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, then

$(x_1 \mathbb{I}_{S_1}, x_2 \mathbb{I}_{S_2}, \dots, x_n \mathbb{I}_{S_n}) \succsim^* (y_1 \mathbb{I}_{S_1}, y_2 \mathbb{I}_{S_2}, \dots, y_n \mathbb{I}_{S_n})$ implies
 $(\dots, (\alpha x_i + (1 - \alpha) z_i) \mathbb{I}_{S_i}, \dots) \succsim^* (\dots, (\alpha y_i + (1 - \alpha) z_i) \mathbb{I}_{S_i}, \dots)$.

The beginning at the end

Proposition

Let $I = \{1, \dots, N\}$ and \succsim^* be a binary relation on \mathcal{X}^* . Tfae:

- (i) \succsim^* satisfies SDEU, TRAN, SCOM, MONO, CONT and INDI;
- (ii) there exist two families
 - $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly increasing continuous functions $u_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$,
 - $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ of strictly positive probability measures $p_i \in \Delta(S_i)$,

such that, given $\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{X}^*$,

$$\mathbf{X} \succsim^* \mathbf{Y} \iff \sum_{i \in I} u_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(X_i)] \geq \sum_{i \in I} u_i^{-1} \mathbb{E}_{p_i} [u_i(Y_i)].$$

The elements of $\{u_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique up to positive affine transformations, the elements of $\{p_i\}_{i \in I}$ are unique.

- In decisions under uncertainty it is natural to associate different sources of risk with different criteria

Conclusions

- In decisions under uncertainty it is natural to associate different sources of risk with different criteria
- Our approach reconciles the methods of classical decision theory under uncertainty with the spirit of multi criteria decision aiding

- In decisions under uncertainty it is natural to associate different sources of risk with different criteria
- Our approach reconciles the methods of classical decision theory under uncertainty with the spirit of multi criteria decision aiding
- It can be easily connected with current trends of decision making under ambiguity and dynamic decision problems